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Introduction 
Manufacturing contracts in the automotive industry have served a ca-
nonical role in the economic theory of contract and bargaining. The famous 
story of General Motors’ relationship with its supplier Fisher Body in the 
1920s is a landmark illustration of the problem of contractual hold up, un-
derlying a prominent theory of vertical integration and the nature of the 
firm.1 The theoretical fascination with automotive procurement contracts is 
well deserved. There may be no other merchant-to-merchant contractual 
template that governs such fantastic economic stakes—hundreds of billions 
                                                                                                                      
 * Professor of Law and Economics, University of Michigan. B.A. 1989, Hebrew Univer-
sity; LL.B. (Law) 1989, Hebrew University; LL.M. 1991, Harvard; Ph.D. (Economics) 1995, 
Harvard; S.J.D. 1995, Harvard. —Ed. 
 ** Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1956, Amherst Col-
lege; J.D. 1962, University of Michigan. —Ed. We are grateful to many automotive officials who 
agreed to be interviewed for this study, and especially to Margaret Baxter of OESA for coordinating 
the suppliers’ survey. For helpful comments on early drafts, we thank the editors of the Michigan 
Law Review, the participants at the “Boilerplate”: Foundations of Market Contracts Symposium at 
the University of Michigan, and workshop participants at the universities of Texas and North Caro-
lina, the Hebrew University, and Tel-Aviv University. Financial support from the Olin Center at the 
University of Michigan Law School is gratefully acknowledged. 
 1. See Benjamin Klein, Hold-Up Problem, in 3 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Eco-
nomics and the Law 241 (Peter K. Newman ed., 1998); Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & 
Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Proc-
ess, 21 J.L. & Econ. 297 (1978). 
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of dollars per year—and implemented through a process that involves al-
most no negotiation of the legal terms. Boilerplate rules these transactions. 
There is a long line of law-and-economics scholarship studying the at-
tributes of standard-form terms in contracts between sophisticated parties in 
high-stakes transactions. One of the benchmark predictions in this literature 
is that contractual terms have to be efficient if they are to be consistently 
used by the parties.2 Any rent-seeking power that a party has should be 
translated into a price advantage; it should not be used to dictate selfish but 
inefficient performance terms. Further, since legal terms such as warranties 
and remedies affect the costs borne by the parties, we expect that sophisti-
cated parties will be “pricing” the terms and will be ready to redraft terms 
that cost more than they save. A study of automobile contracts provides an 
opportunity to test these predictions. These are transactions in which eco-
nomic power is unevenly distributed; much dickering takes place over prices 
and product design; but everything else is packed into boilerplate. Every 
party reads the boilerplate and understands its legal effect and its economic 
consequences. Do strong parties dictate efficient boilerplate and extract 
rents through prices and other purely distributive clauses? Do they tailor 
their terms to maximize their net gains from the transactions? 
Moreover, automotive supply contracts are the paradigmatic long-term 
relationships that require a great deal of relationship-specific investments in 
the form of machinery, location of plants, and precontractual technology 
research. As the economic literature predicts, the interdependence of suppli-
ers (who must invest in specializing for their buyers’ needs) and buyers 
(who need specialized parts from their suppliers) gives opportunities for 
hold up.3 These dangers make the contracts the primary tool for deterring 
hold up and encouraging investment. What are the contractual techniques 
used to address the risk of hold up? 
In answering these questions, we have taken a simple, almost naïve ap-
proach. We read and compared industry boilerplate contracts and talked to 
lawyers who drafted these forms and to some non-lawyer industry partici-
pants. We provide a case study, but it yields some general insights. For 
example, the boilerplate contract terms between the Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (“OEMs”) and the tier-1 suppliers show how economic 
power is translated into transactional advantage. From the contract terms, 
we can identify ways the OEMs extract value from their suppliers. Contrary 
to the fabled GM–Fisher Body story, we find no real problem of hold up by 
suppliers. The claim that suppliers with a long-term contract can hold up the 
OEMs is based on a misunderstanding of the terms of the deal, the rules of 
contract law, and the structure of the market. Moreover, comparing the terms 
that appear in the purchase orders of the various OEMs reveals ways in 
                                                                                                                      
 2. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Struc-
ture of Corporate Law 1–39 (1991); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the 
Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L. J. 541, 545–46 (2003) (sophisticated firms are expected to 
write contracts that maximize efficiency). 
 3. Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure 7 (1995); Oliver Wil-
liamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 114–15 (1985). 
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which they differ and, surprisingly, it suggests that some of these terms may 
foster inefficiency. Finally, studying the way the form contracts are drafted 
gives a detailed understanding of how and when tailoring of terms takes 
place and how internal organizational features are harnessed to affect the 
outcome of negotiations over contract terms. 
The study of contracting in the automotive industry also provides an op-
portunity to investigate the design of contracts in an industry that deals with 
fascinating economic changes. One major change has to do with the organi-
zation of production. By 1960, Ford was making almost everything from 
floor mats to steel within the company, and the other OEMs had a nearly 
equal degree of vertical integration.4 But since the early 1980s, the trend 
toward vertical integration has reversed.5 The biggest American OEM, Gen-
eral Motors, which used to produce up to seventy percent of its parts 
internally, is now only thirty-percent integrated. OEMs have shed whole 
divisions, most notably Delphi6 and Visteon,7 and have started to buy large 
subassemblies such as consoles, brake assemblies, and even frames from 
outside suppliers. With the business changing so vastly, have contracts 
changed as well? 
Another major change in the automotive industry is its profitability. 
American OEMs lose money; this is no secret. Ford and General Motors, 
two bastions of American industrial power, issue debt that is graded as 
junk.8 Since the OEMs are limited in their ability to renegotiate with their 
most burdensome creditors9—their current and retired employees—they 
have turned to their suppliers. The drive to save money by paying suppliers 
less that began in the mid-1980s has accelerated, and as these suppliers are 
pressed, the pressure cascades down the supply chain. This study traces the 
cascade of the contract terms that suppliers are required to accept. 
The automotive supply industry is sometimes described as a pyramid built 
in “tiers.” At the top are the OEMs. This Article focuses mostly on the “Big 
Three” OEMs—General Motors, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler—but it looks 
also at six foreign OEMs who assemble cars in the U.S. and who are a grow-
ing force in the American manufacturing market. Directly below the OEMs 
are the “tier-1” suppliers—anyone who sells directly to an OEM. These com-
panies usually sell sophisticated assemblies or parts, and most of them 
specialize in designing and manufacturing automotive-specific products. They 
                                                                                                                      
 4. See Christoph Scherrer, Governance of the Automobile Industry: The Transformation of 
Labor and Supplier Relations, in Governance of the American Economy 209, 217–18 (John L. 
Campbell et al. eds., 1991). 
 5. See id. at 220. 
 6. Dale Buss, Perfect Storm: The Fate of U.S. Manufacturing Lies in the Hands of CEOs 
like Delphi’s J.T. Battenberg, Chief Executive, Oct. 2004, at 38. 
 7. Robert Barker, Visteon: What’s that Funny Noise?, Bus. Wk., July 3, 2000, at 159. 
 8. Jamie Butters, Reasons for Junk Ratings: Downgraded GM, Ford Must Shrink, S&P 
Analyst Says, Detroit Free Press, May 7, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 22438709 . 
 9. Jeff Green, General Motors Comes Up Short in First Quarter, Seattle Times, Apr. 20, 
2005, at E2; Eric Mayne, Ford May Cut Factory Jobs Next, Detroit News, June 23, 2005, at 1. 
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purchase their supplies from “tier-2” suppliers, who in turn purchase from 
“tier-3” suppliers, and so on. Since there are only a few OEMs at the top but 
roughly six hundred to eight hundred tier-1 suppliers,10 a pyramid is an inac-
curate metaphor. The metaphor is important, as we will explain below. The 
main issues that need to be governed by the contracts between OEMs and 
tier-1 suppliers are different than in lower tiers. Some of that difference will 
be attributed to the fact that there is a much smaller set of potential buyers 
above tier-1 sellers than there is above sellers in the lower tiers. 
This Article is structured as follows. Part I compares the terms and con-
ditions in the purchase orders of the OEMs and highlights important 
differences in the substance of these boilerplate provisions. It argues that 
these differences cannot be easily reconciled with the prediction that sophis-
ticated parties draft the most efficient boilerplate terms. Part II examines 
how these forms are drafted, how their terms are negotiated, and how the 
OEMs guard their terms from erosion. It provides some insight on how tai-
loring occurs and how the internal organization of a party to a deal affects 
the terms that this party can secure. Part III focuses on the role of economic 
power. There, we examine how power is harnessed to administer and modify 
contracts. This analysis revisits the claims made on the basis of the GM–
Fisher Body deal and argues that some of these claims are not valid. We 
demonstrate the subtle ways in which hold up and renegotiation are cur-
tailed. Finally, Part IV examines ways in which a less powerful party can 
nevertheless get favorable contract terms. 
I. The Contracts 
Supply contracts in the automotive industry are made through competi-
tive bidding. An OEM issues requests for quotations for a particular part or 
assembly. The supplier whose bid is picked would ordinarily make a signifi-
cant capital investment in R&D and production assets, and supply this part 
for the duration of the car model in which the part is assembled, a period 
that normally lasts four to eight years. The winning bidder, however, does 
not always get the security of a long-term, fixed-price contract. While some 
OEMs accord the supplier a long-term sourcing commitment, the actual 
purchase orders are issued on a short-term basis.11 Shorter contracts give the 
parties opportunities to renegotiate aspects of the deal like price and quan-
tity estimates; OEMs commonly demand (and receive) price reductions 
every year.12 Technically, most of these adjustments are not modifications of 
the contract but rather renewals of short-term purchase orders (“POs”), all 
entered into under a master long-term agreement. 
                                                                                                                      
 10. Auto Industry M&A Value Soars, Auto Beat Daily, Nov. 12, 2003, at 1. 
 11. Original Equip. Suppliers Ass’n, OEM North American Production P.O. Con-
tract Terms and Conditions Comparative Analysis 15 (2004) [hereinafter OESA Analysis]. 
 12. Patricia Panchak, Supplier Partnerships Provide a Competitive Edge, Indus. Wk., Sept. 
2004, at 9. 
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The contracts we looked at are the boilerplate POs governing the actual 
supply agreements. While there is some interest in the long-term master 
agreements, their language is usually brief and subordinates them to the 
terms of the shorter-duration POs. The OEMs draft and issue these forms 
through a process that will be described in Section II. Each OEM has a sin-
gle form, titled either “Global Terms” or “General Terms,” that is used 
almost without exception for procuring all of the manufacturing parts. Gen-
eral Motors, for example, enters into roughly one million procurement 
contracts every year, at a total amount in excess of $80 billion—all governed 
by a single contract form containing thirty-one paragraphs,13 translated into 
six languages. In terms of economic stakes, this form may be the single 
most important commercial contractual document ever drafted. In the re-
mainder of this section, we compare the standard forms of the North 
American OEMs.14 
Before we started this study, our conjecture was that we would find 
similar boilerplate language throughout this industry. Influenced by the eco-
nomic theory of standard-form contracts, we expected these contracts 
between ultra-sophisticated parties to include efficient arrangements. Surely 
the OEMs have significant bargaining power vis-à-vis their suppliers; but 
economic theory teaches us that it would be wise to use this power in ex-
tracting more favorable bottom-line prices, not by extracting inefficient, 
one-sided legal terms.15 Moreover, our expectation that the forms would be 
uniform throughout the industry was influenced by the fact that they are all 
issued in a highly repetitive fashion to the same group of tier-1 suppliers—
those very large manufacturing companies that supply the main parts and 
assemblies to the OEMs. These are sophisticated counterparties who read 
the contracts and assess the costs of the terms. OEMs cannot “sneak in” in-
efficient terms that would go unnoticed. Further, a uniform format, we 
expected, would minimize drafting costs: why draft a new form if your com-
petitor already produced one? More importantly, it would also be consistent 
with learning externalities: why start with a fresh form when there is already 
much experience in interpreting and relying on familiar language in existing 
forms? Finally, uniform templates would generate network externalities, by 
making it easier to predict costs (e.g., of warranty terms) in order to com-
pare bids across companies and to price individual terms.16 In sum, based on 
                                                                                                                      
 13. General Motors General Terms and Conditions (Sept. 2004) (on file with authors). 
 14. Some of the contracts were given to us with the understanding that they will not be 
posted publicly. We shared the contracts with the Michigan Law Review editors for cite checking. In 
the event that we receive clearance from our interviewees to post the contracts, they will be available 
through a Web link at www.umich.edu/~omri. 
 15. Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in 
Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 361 (1991); Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Non-
substantive Unconscionability, 63 Va. L. Rev. 1053 (1977). 
 16. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate 
Contracting, 83 Va. L. Rev. 713 (1997); Michael Klausner, Corporate Law and Networks of Eco-
nomic Effects, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757 (1995). 
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observations about other industries,17 we expected little variation in the 
OEMs’ forms. 
What we found was a different reality. There is significant variance 
across the OEM contracts. We examined the boilerplates of nine North 
American OEMs18 and recorded the many ways in which they differ. These 
differences were also confirmed in discussions with representatives of tier-1 
suppliers and of the suppliers’ trade association, who emphasized that the 
differences in the legal terms represent in some cases significant variations 
in the economic consequences of the deals. While the variation of terms 
itself may indicate that some of these terms are inefficient, our analysis fo-
cuses on the content of the terms. We attempt to understand and explain 
their business logic and examine whether they are likely to maximize the 
joint surplus. 
According to all of our interviewees, the most important issues in the 
OEM boilerplate contracts are the following: termination rights, warranties 
and remedies, tooling (the ownership of the production assets), intellectual 
property rights in technological innovations, and service parts. Consider 
each of these issues. 
Termination. In all purchase contracts, OEMs secure the right unilater-
ally to terminate the agreement.19 This right to terminate, which is not 
available to suppliers, is almost unrestricted. Either for no cause at all, or for 
reasons stated ambiguously as “competitiveness of price and quality,” the 
OEMs can, with short notice, terminate the contract. In fact, the cancellation 
rights are so one-sided that they might render the contracts unenforceable on 
the ground that they lack consideration or fail to state a quantity term under 
the statute of frauds.20 There is variation among OEMs’ forms regarding the 
                                                                                                                      
 17. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An 
Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 Emory L.J. 929, 939 (2004). 
 18. The nine OEMs who assemble cars in North America are: General Motors, Ford, Daim-
lerChrysler, Honda, Toyota, Nissan, Hyundai, VW, and BMW. 
 19. See, e.g., General Motors General Terms and Conditions § 13 (Sept. 2004) (on file with 
authors); Ford Motor Company Production Purchasing Global Terms and Conditions § 27 (Jan. 
2004) (on file with authors); DaimlerChrysler Production Purchasing General Terms and Conditions 
§ 20 (May 2003) (on file with authors). 
 20. Ford’s contract says: “27.01 Termination. The Buyer may terminate the Purchase Order, 
in whole or in part, at any time and for any or no reason, upon Written Notice to the Supplier. The 
Supplier may not terminate at its option.” This term replaced an earlier termination clause that re-
quired a thirty-day notice. Similarly, General Motors’s contract gives it the right to cancel the 
transaction within thirty days if the supplier cannot match the rivals’ lower cost or competitive tech-
nology, design, or quality. These provisions come close to rendering the contracts illusory. Still, the 
requirement of a written notice in Ford’s contract, and of a thirty-day notice in GM’s contract, may 
constitute the necessary restriction to render these contracts enforceable. See, e.g., Williston, Law 
of Contracts § 105, at 418–19 (3d ed. 1957). The termination term may also create a problem 
under the statute of frauds. Courts that have adjudicated similar provisions in lower-tier cases and 
one recent OEM–tier-1 case have held the contracts to be unenforceable. See, e.g., Dedoes Indus., v. 
Target Steel, No. 254413, 2005 WL 1224700 (Mich. Ct. App. May 24, 2005) (holding that a price 
quote in which seller promises to supply buyer’s steel requirements for the next three years does not 
satisfy the quantity provision of the statute of frauds); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Steel Dynamics, No. 
CR-04-056983-CK (Cir. Ct. Oakland County, Mich. Aug. 4, 2004) (holding that GM’s award letter 
confirming the purchase of approximately 70,000 metric tons of steel did not satisfy statute of 
frauds because it contained only an approximate quantity, not a guaranteed purchase). 
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payments to which suppliers are entitled upon termination. While all OEMs 
provide some recovery to suppliers for their squandered investments, some 
are stingy—they pay only for finished parts, work in progress, and raw ma-
terials.21 Others are more generous: they will pay for a combination of other 
termination costs, such as suppliers’ obligations to their own subcontractors 
and investments in capital.22 None of the OEMs cover suppliers’ unamor-
tized investment in R&D and engineering—a great source of agony for 
suppliers who expect to cover their fixed costs only after several years of 
supply. Indeed, as we note below, OEMs recognize the potential unfairness 
of a sudden termination and are willing to grant ad hoc accommodations 
that go beyond their legal responsibility.23 
It is difficult to identify the exact inefficiency that broad termination 
rights create, particularly since it is not clear how often these rights are ex-
ercised. Still, contracts containing harsh termination terms represent a de-
facto transformation of the long-term commitment into a series of short-
term agreements. In this reality, suppliers anticipate pressures from OEMs 
to reduce prices even after they have been awarded a contract. This creates a 
risk of hold up by OEMs—“reduce your price or be terminated”—that 
makes relationship-specific investments less valuable. 
Warranties and Remedies. Warranty provisions are important legal terms 
for they determine suppliers’ liability for design defects, intellectual prop-
erty infringements, and the cost of precautionary recalls. OEMs specify 
what fraction of the total liability bill would be borne by suppliers and grant 
themselves rights to setoff warranty charges against payments owed to sup-
pliers.24 When an OEM finds itself liable for a design problem, there may be 
a genuine dispute as to whether the problem originates from a defective part 
for which the supplier is liable, or from faulty integration of the part by the 
OEM. Anticipating such disputes, OEMs include standard clauses that grant 
them self-help power to recover from the supplier. GM’s rights to recover 
                                                                                                                      
 21. See, e.g., Daimler Chrysler Production Purchasing General Terms and Conditions § 20 
(May 2003) (on file with authors); General Motors General Terms and Conditions § 13 (Sept. 2004) 
(on file with authors). 
 22. See, e.g., Ford Motor Company Production Purchasing Global Terms and Conditions 
§ 27.03 (Jan. 2004) (on file with authors). 
 23. The willingness of parties to go beyond the boilerplate and to grant concessions that are 
tailored ad hoc to the needs of their counterparts is discussed in Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of 
Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation 
between Businesses and Consumers, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 857 (2006) and in Lucian A. Bebchuk & 
Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 827 
(2006); see also Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, Wis. L. Rev. 679, 
704–07 (2004); Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of “Unfair” Contractual Arrange-
ments, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 356, 358–60 (1980). 
 24. See, e.g., Ford Motor Company Production Purchasing Global Terms and Conditions 
§ 11.01 (Jan. 2004) (on file with authors) (“Buyer may set off and recoup against the Buyer’s ac-
counts payable to the Supplier any amounts for which the Buyer determines in good faith the 
Supplier is liable to it. . . . The Buyer may do so without notice to the Supplier.”); id. § 23.06 (“At its 
option, the Buyer may debit the Supplier for up to 50% of the Actual Recall Costs . . . if the Buyer 
has made a good faith determination that the Supplier is likely to be liable for some portion of the 
total costs . . . .”). 
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one hundred percent of the liability when it unilaterally decides that the 
parts failed to conform to the warranty and to setoff the entire charge against 
the supplier’s account are among the toughest. Ford stipulates that the sup-
plier’s share of liability will be negotiated ex post but allows itself a 
unilateral setoff, to be charged before such negotiation concludes, of up to 
fifty percent of the cost. This setoff is against the amount owed by the sup-
plier or by any of its more liquid affiliates and subsidiaries. Some 
companies’ terms entitle them to make the liability apportionment without 
the supplier being heard. Others provide that the parties will negotiate the 
allocation of liability costs to reflect actual responsibility.25 
In practice, these variations in sharing-of-liability clauses reflect true 
differences in the cost allocations, and, importantly, they enable different 
systems for monitoring of defects. It appears that OEMs with the most self-
serving warranty allocation terms are also those that take longest to detect 
and resolve a defect. That is, they are the ones for whom the total costs of 
defects are, on average, greater. One of our interviewees quoted the war-
ranty cost per vehicle to be roughly $1000 for an American OEM that uses 
the harshest warranty allocation terms,26 but only about $250 for a Japanese 
OEM that applies a more balanced approach.27 Further, he pointed out that 
the American OEM takes, on average, 180 days from the time of the first 
indications of a parts defect until it is resolved; the Japanese OEM takes 
only forty days.28 Of course, Japanese cars may simply be better built than 
American cars. But other figures suggest that if there is quality gap, it is not 
as significant as the gap in warranty costs. One way to measure intrinsic 
quality is the average number of problems per one hundred vehicles. Toyota 
and Honda, for example, reported in 2003 101 problems per one hundred 
vehicles; GM, Chrysler, and Ford reported between 120 to 127 problems per 
one hundred vehicles.29 This small quality gap is much smaller than the war-
ranty-cost gap, in which an American OEM suffers a cost roughly four times 
as high as that of the Japanese OEM.  
                                                                                                                      
 25. Some of the lower-tier contracts we examined include an equally harsh warranty burden 
on the supplier. For example, some large tier-1 manufacturers put a warranty burden of 100% on the 
supplier in their own contracts with tier-2s. See, e.g., Delphi Corp. General Terms and Conditions 
§ 7.3 (Mar. 2004) (on file with authors) (“If any goods are reasonably determined . . . to fail to con-
form to the warranties set forth in this Contract, Seller shall reimburse Buyer for all reasonable 
losses, costs and damages caused by such nonconforming goods.”) (emphasis added). There is an 
important difference, however, between the OEMs’ terms and the identical tier-1 terms. OEMs have 
the power to actually impose almost any share of the liability on their suppliers; tier-1s, in contrast, 
are more constrained, as they expect their suppliers to fight back. 
 26. Jane Spencer, The Best Car Deal Around: Never Paying for Repairs—New Longer War-
ranties Open Door to Car Hypochondriacs, Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 2002, at D1. 
 27. Craig Fitzgerald, Getting Serious About Quality, Auto. Indus., July 2004, at 45. A 
different source suggests that American OEMs spend on warranty claims between $537 to $628 per 
vehicle, whereas Japanese vehicles average only $226 per vehicle sold in the United States. See  
Auto Warranties, Warranty Week, January 27, 2004, http://www.warrantyweek.com/archive/ 
ww20040127.html.  
 28. Interview with Matthew Paroly, Managing Commercial Attorney, Delphi Corporation, in 
Troy, Mich. (July 28, 2005). 
 29. Fitzgerald, supra note 27. 
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These figures are consistent with the prediction that parties who believe 
that they can shift the cost of liability onto others would do less to reduce 
this cost. Put differently, in situations in which joint precautions by both 
supplier and buyer are necessary to prevent liability from mounting or in 
which suppliers can efficiently cure a defect, it is not surprising that the al-
location of greater liability to the supplier reduces the OEM’s need for a 
quick solution to any quality issue.30 What is surprising is that not all con-
tracts are designed to induce more participation of the suppliers in the 
warranty process, and thus fail to achieve efficiency.31 
Service Parts. The arrangements governing service parts can be a source 
of important profit for suppliers as well as a significant burden. Service 
parts are sold in the retail market at a large premium. If the OEM alone may 
sell these parts, the supplier is deprived of a share of potential profits. More-
over, if the supplier is obligated to supply the OEM’s requirements for these 
parts for years after the model production ends (when it is expected that 
volume efficiency, materials, and skilled personnel will no longer be avail-
able), the burden on the supplier can be large.  
Almost all OEMs require the supplier to agree to supply service parts 
for a period of ten to fifteen years after current-model production ends. 
Some OEMs, however, share the surplus that this production will yield. 
Honda and Toyota,32 for example, stipulate that the service part prices will 
be negotiated by the parties when the time comes; that translates to a profit-
sharing deal. Others (for instance, GM) require prices to remain at their low, 
production-phase price for an initial period, say three years,33 after which a 
higher negotiated price would be agreed upon. Most harsh are terms that 
require suppliers to commit to fifteen years of post-production supply and to 
refrain from raising prices above the production-phase prices.34 These 
                                                                                                                      
 30. It is interesting to compare the OEM’s warranty terms with those appearing in the boiler-
plate purchase contract drafted by the Verband der Automobilindustrie [German Association of the 
Automotive Industry] (“VDA”), which applies to all procurement contracts in all tiers. The VDA’s 
warranty and remedies provisions give the supplier a greater role in assessing any damage claim, 
participating in repairs and replacements, and being consulted before any action is taken by the 
buyer. The VDA’s terms also limit the duration of warranties, reduce their scope when the supplier is 
not negligent, and allow a host of opportunities to cure. See Einkaufsbedingungen, [General Terms 
and Conditions for the Purchase of Production Material and Spare Parts], Verband der Automobilin-
dustrie (May 12, 2002) (on file with authors), English translation available at http://www.vda.de/ 
en/vda/intern/organisation/abteilungen/recht_01.html. 
 31. Similarly, OEMs draft broad indemnity terms entitling them to reimbursement of ex-
penses for the legal defense of claims, such as products liability, for which the supplier will 
ultimately be responsible. Suppliers are nervous about being unable to control or influence the liti-
gation of such claims while at the same time being liable for damages and litigation costs. 
 32. See, e.g., Toyota Motors Manufacturing North America, Inc. Terms and Conditions 
§ 4.2(d) (Oct. 1998) (on file with authors) (“[Toyota] will establish, after good faith negotiation with 
Supplier, a price for Service Parts.”). 
 33. General Motors General Terms and Conditions § 20 (Sept. 2004) (on file with authors) 
(“During the 15 year period after Buyer completes current model purchases, Seller will sell goods to 
Buyer to fulfill Buyer’s past model service and replacement parts requirements. . . . [T]he price(s) 
during the first 3 years of this period shall be those in effect at the conclusion of current model 
purchases.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Nissan North America, Inc. Master Purchase Agreement § 19 (2003). 
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provisions were described by a tier-1 supplier as “cyanide pills”—leaving 
the supplier with the high cost of maintaining a production line but without 
the ability to recoup this expense through high volume of sales. 
The service parts provisions are not only a matter of division of surplus; 
they also have efficiency implications. When a car model is discontinued by 
an OEM, the production volume of parts obviously declines substantially. 
Maintaining the production line and the skilled labor to produce the parts 
will be expensive. Pricing the parts based on the cost structure prevailing 
when volume is much higher is a poor way to reflect the true wholesale eco-
nomic price and may lead to suboptimal purchase decisions. For example, 
supplier representatives complained about the OEMs’ reluctance to hold 
minor inventories of parts and their tendency to make frequent small-volume 
purchases; that requires the suppliers to “turn on the machines” repeatedly 
to produce small, highly inefficient quantities of parts. Schemes that accord 
the suppliers a greater share of the surplus might create incentives to reduce 
these inefficiencies. 
Intellectual Property. The production of assembly parts often requires 
the development and application of new technologies that have high value as 
intellectual property beyond that particular application. Much of this tech-
nology passes over to the OEMs in the course of designing the parts and 
assembling them into the vehicles. The contracts grant the OEMs legal 
rights in these valuable information assets, not only to use them in produc-
tion but also to control other uses. Suppliers—particularly those for whom 
the technology is the main asset—care greatly about this type of appropria-
tion. Here, too, there is surprising variation in the scope of rights secured by 
different OEMs. The most extreme position accords the OEMs unlimited 
rights to all intellectual property of the supplier that is disclosed in the 
course of trade, except for patents registered before the supply.35 Suppliers 
also waive their trade secret protection, and assign to the OEMs all copy-
rightable works created under the contract without any royalty rights. These 
rights are often for unlimited duration, extending beyond the termination of 
the contract. The more restrained position of other OEMs limits the OEMs’ 
right to sublicense intellectual property and guarantees that the confidential 
information of the supplier will not be disclosed.36 
As will be noted below, some suppliers refuse to grant such rights in 
their intellectual property. Companies whose main business is information 
technology (“IT”), such as the makers of software, are stubborn about this, 
and OEMs have learned to expect that they will not be able to dictate their 
terms to such suppliers. Indeed, some OEMs have specially drafted IT con-
tracts that accommodate the expectations of their IT suppliers for more 
balanced terms. Still, most production parts are supplied by manufacturing 
                                                                                                                      
 35. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. Production Purchasing Global Terms and Conditions §§ 16, 
20.01 (Jan. 2004) (on file with authors); Hyundai Motor Manufacturing General Terms and Condi-
tions § 19 (undated) (on file with authors). 
 36. See, e.g., General Motors General Terms and Conditions § 14 (Sept. 2004) (on file with 
authors); Nissan North America, Inc. Master Purchase Agreement § 15.2 (2003) (on file with au-
thors). 
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companies whose main business is not IT, and these suppliers were not able 
to protect their investment in innovative technology as well as the IT suppli-
ers do. 
Since OEMs do not tailor their intellectual property terms specifically for 
each supplier, the boilerplate can be a significant source of inefficiency. Sup-
pliers that have the ability to develop new technologies, but who cannot enjoy 
the full value of the technology they develop once appropriated by the OEM, 
will have a weaker incentive to make investments. We can only speculate that 
OEMs that insist on harsh IP terms end up with cars that incorporate fewer 
technological advances. Some of the suppliers’ representatives suggested that 
this is the case. 
Tooling. The machinery and production assets used in manufacturing re-
quires costly investments. When an OEM pays for these investments, the 
contract establishes that the OEM owns the tooling and permits the supplier 
to use the tooling to serve this OEM. The OEM contracts forbid commin-
gling—the use of the tools for assembly of parts directed to other OEMs. 
Thus, on termination, OEMs can haul away the tooling and even charge the 
supplier with some of the costs of shipping.  
Representatives of tier-1 suppliers voiced many complaints against the 
tooling provisions. A repeated complaint was that OEMs refused to allow 
the use of production assets to serve multiple clients. The strict ownership 
terms and the restriction against commingling and co-serving can lead to 
wasteful duplicity of investments and, of course, to inefficiency. Moreover, 
this strict control of the machines makes the OEMs’ potential threat to ter-
minate a contract (and haul away the production line) more credible. The 
fear that relationship-specific investments by the suppliers would be squan-
dered increases. 
 
* * * 
 
What can we learn from these examples of fundamental variations in the 
contract terms? We present this variation in the contracts as a puzzle; it con-
trasts with some of the conjectures we had before this study. While each 
OEM has its own boilerplate, there is surprisingly little borrowing from each 
other. Each OEM knows its competitors’ forms well, but rarely copies any 
provision from them. In this sense, boilerplate in this industry has not risen 
to the level of quasi-statute that it has achieved in other industries.37 And 
while factors relating to corporate culture can explain the persistence of this 
variation and the lack of convergence, it is hard to find an efficiency expla-
nation.  
Of course, contract terms do not always reflect actual practices. The ac-
tual behavior under the contract may not vary as much as the variation in 
                                                                                                                      
 37. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1129 (2006); 
Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1105 (2006). 
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contract language.38 There is some indication that OEMs may not enforce 
inefficient one-sided terms. For example, in a section titled “Supplier Fre-
quently Asked Questions” appended to its Global Terms and Conditions, 
Ford explains that one of the most troubling new provisions in this form, the 
setoff term, was never used literally and only infrequently used at all.39 So it 
is possible that the inefficiency of some terms is only on paper and that in 
practice, the OEMs apply systematic “tailored forgiveness” of some of the 
harsher provisions.40 Still, it is hard to reconcile this understanding with the 
angry opposition that suppliers displayed toward Ford’s recent redraft and 
the collective effort that suppliers invested through their association to 
change some of the terms. 
Variation of terms across vendors does not itself indicate inefficiency. 
There may be varying efficient ways to do business. But looking at individ-
ual terms in their context, we believe that some of the boilerplate terms are 
inefficient. Warranty terms of some OEMs do not appear to solve a surplus 
maximization problem but rather to place the greatest ex-post burden on the 
seller. Likewise, IP terms and service parts arrangements of some OEMs do 
not reflect an optimal sharing of a resource that is jointly created, but in-
stead provide one-sided gains. Given the enormous stakes, we expected that 
economic power would be used to dictate low prices, not selfish boilerplate. 
But that is not what we found.  
We do not claim that the boilerplate terms are the cause of the ineffi-
ciency. It is more plausible that many of these provisions, as we will argue 
below, are tailored to leverage the OEMs’ economic and bargaining power 
in the negotiation stage into advantages at the performance stage, in which 
the parties are locked in a classic bilateral monopoly. The legal terms in the 
forms are the tail that is wagged by the business dog, not vice versa. It is 
clear that the American OEMs’ record-breaking losses have driven them to 
capture any opportunity to shift costs to suppliers. But if indeed they do so 
in a way that reduces the overall surplus of the contracts, what we are wit-
nessing is a classic agency problem: agents find ways to save costs in the 
domain that they control but often neglect to consider the effect of these 
cost-saving measures on activities that they do not control. If the pressure on 
suppliers is strong enough, they will accept harsh terms and low prices. And 
if there are inefficient consequences, they may eventually be counted on the 
scorecard of a different internal division. The lawyers and purchasing offi-
cials who write and negotiate the supply contracts invest much effort in 
tightening up the legal terms and in leveraging the OEMs’ bargaining power 
in securing adherence to these terms. It is possible that this exercise of their 
power will degrade suppliers’ cooperation and performance in ways that 
become clear only later. 
                                                                                                                      
 38. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963). 
 39. Ford Motor Company Production Purchasing Global Terms and Conditions, Supplier 
Frequently Asked Questions, § 11.02 (Jan. 2004) (on file with authors). 
 40. See Johnston, supra note 23. 
BEN-SHAHAR & WHITE FINAL TYPE.DOC 2/16/2006 11:09 AM 
March 2006] Auto Manufacturing Contracts 965 
 
II. Drafting of Boilerplate 
One of the striking features of automotive supply contracts between 
OEMs and their tier-1 suppliers is their simplicity. Each OEM has a single 
form used for procuring all of the manufacturing parts. General Motors, we 
mentioned, enters into roughly one million procurement contracts every 
year with suppliers all over the world. With very little exception, these deals 
are governed by GM’s “Global Terms”—terms that are never challenged, 
neither at the negotiation stage (say, by battle of the forms) nor in litiga-
tion.41 
Another notable feature of these boilerplate forms is their durability. 
DaimlerChrysler, for example, is still using the form that was drafted in 
1985; GM’s form goes back to 1986. Ford’s old form had been in place 
since the 1950s, until it was recently revised in quite a dramatic fashion in 
2004. While minor revisions addressing new problems are patched onto 
these forms occasionally,42 the main terms and conditions remain unchanged 
over a long period of time. This rigidity of the forms is not so much a fea-
ture of interpretive or learning externality (that is, the adherence to 
something familiar with a predictable meaning), but rather a reflection of an 
OEM’s belief that the terms in its form work well and serve its profit goals. 
These boilerplate contracts are simple. The terms are written in plain Eng-
lish. Although most of the tier-1 suppliers are large corporations with 
sophisticated legal counsel who read every word of the OEM contracts, and 
although each provision in these contracts can have significant effects on the 
division of the surplus, the clauses are drafted in a much simpler and shorter 
form than ordinary consumer contracts. For example, GM’s warranty provi-
sion is three sentences long. The main part says that “Seller warrants/ 
guarantees that the goods covered by this contract will conform to the specifi-
cation, drawing, samples, or description furnished to or by Buyer, and will be 
merchantable, of good material and workmanship and free of defect.”43 The 
warranty paragraph adds that the goods “will be fit and sufficient for the 
particular purposes intended by the Buyer” and that the duration of the war-
ranty will match the warranty provided by the Buyer to its customers.44 This 
                                                                                                                      
 41. Only three litigated cases between OEMs and their suppliers were found. In the most 
recent, GM was granted summary judgment. Nartron Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 232085, 2003 
WL 1985261, at *9 (Mich. Ct. App. April 29, 2003). Another arose because of a fight over an in-
demnification provision; a third party was hurt while installing a piece of equipment at GM’s plant 
and the equipment manufacturer tried (successfully) to get out of the indemnification provision that 
was in GM’s purchase order. Hallberg v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 87 C 6478, 1989 WL 153340 
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 1989). The only other case is from 1979. S.C. Gray, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 286 
N.W.2d 34 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979). 
 42. An example of the type of revisions we observed is GM’s employment conditions clause 
requiring the supplier to refrain from engaging in “corrupt business practices” such as using child 
and prisoner labor. See General Motors General Terms and Conditions, Revised Draft § 25 (Sept. 
2004) (on file with authors). 
 43. See General Motors General Terms and Conditions § 9 (Sept. 2004) (on file with au-
thors). 
 44. Id. Ford’s Purchase Order form, stretching over thirty-one pages, is an exception to the 
rule that OEM contracts are short. Ford’s form, which was launched in 2004 following a significant 
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paragraph is strikingly different than warranty terms in, say, consumer con-
tracts, which are usually lengthy, cumbersome, and legalistic. Perhaps this 
difference owes to the greater government regulation of consumer warran-
ties; perhaps it has to do with the identity of the drafter—a buyer or seller. A 
seller-drafter needs to avoid the sweeping warranties of the UCC, whereas 
buyers like the OEMs need only to strengthen the pro-buyer UCC warran-
ties. Note, also, that the difference between warranty terms in the auto 
production context and other, consumer-related contracts cannot be ex-
plained by factors like trade usage and course of dealing. The supplier’s 
warranty to the OEM is governed solely by the express warranty term. 
Since boilerplate terms have to deal with many different types of situa-
tions and address many possible contingencies, drafting the standard form 
from scratch would seem a daunting task. It is often perceived, therefore, 
that the drafting of boilerplate language in mass contracts involves not much 
more than a cut-and-paste task, whereby the drafter identifies similar forms 
used by other organizations that do similar business and—on the premise 
that “if they work for others they’ll also work for me”—borrows their lan-
guage.45 Interestingly, the American OEM supply contracts were not drafted 
in this fashion. Each OEM contract was drafted by in-house attorneys in a 
concentrated effort over a short period of time with very little revision 
since.46 These attorneys are familiar with the forms used by their competi-
tors but seldom copy or borrow language from these sources. Unlike the 
drafting work done by outside law firms, the in-house drafting attorneys 
have a task that is ongoing. While revisions in the forms are rare, the draft-
ing attorneys remain with the organization for a long period of time, 
carrying with them the institutional memory concerning the drafter’s intent 
and the rationales for the chosen language. Memory, of course, is a neces-
sary trait for parties who enter long-term relationships or into portfolios of 
deals, in which violations are addressed (and deterred) by informal sanc-
tions within the relationship or by refusals to deal.  
Given the simplicity of the forms and the ambitious goal to apply them 
to each and every manufacturing parts contract, how do OEMs overcome the 
different needs and objections of their tier-1 suppliers? Part of the answer, of 
course, concerns the performance and enforcement strategies, which we will 
discuss later. There, we will show, some patterns of flexibility have 
emerged. In the contract formation stage, however, we observe very little 
flexibility. Either take our contract as it is, or leave. This rigidity is main-
tained in several ways, as explained below. 
                                                                                                                      
overhaul, does contain simple language, but it covers many more contingencies than other OEM 
contracts. Still, Ford’s warranty term is almost identical to GM’s, and equally short. 
 45. There are many theoretical accounts of this “stickiness” of boilerplate. See, e.g., Robert 
B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in the Shadow of the International 
Order, 53 Emory L.J. 691, 713–21 (2004); Omri Ben-Shahar & John Pottow, On the Stickiness of 
Contractual Default Rules, Fl. St. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2006); Choi & Gulati, supra note 37, at 
1157–59; Kahan & Klausner, supra note 16, at 761–64. 
 46. But see Klaus-Dieter Floerecke, German Suppliers Revolt Against Ford Motor: Vendors 
Demand Contract Revisions, Auto. News, Apr. 19, 2004, at 10. 
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No Battles of the Forms. Battles of the forms, in which the seller re-
sponds to the OEM’s purchase order with a confirmation that contains 
different boilerplate terms, have the standard result that conflicting terms on 
both sides drop out. The battle of the forms might, of course, enable a sup-
plier to substitute its own terms for some of the OEM’s more onerous terms. 
One might predict that the battle of the forms would be common in automo-
tive contracting. 
As far as we were able to determine, there is no battle-of-the-forms ma-
neuvering against OEMs.47 We could not find reference to a single legal 
dispute on battle of the forms with an OEM, and none of the OEM or tier-1 
representatives were able to quote an example. Battles-of-the-forms disputes 
are not avoided by forcing the supplier to acquiesce ex post to the OEM’s 
terms. Rather, they are prevented ex ante by the OEM’s insisting at the time 
that it invites bids that, as a condition for bidding, the supplier must agree to 
be bound by the boilerplate terms of the OEM’s form. Since the bidding 
occurs before the contract has been issued and at the time when the sup-
plier’s position is the weakest—at the time when its refusal to commit to the 
OEM’s boilerplate could cost it the opportunity to bid—it is not surprising 
that most tier-1 suppliers agree not to engage in the battle of the forms and 
instead sign or otherwise agree to a form that binds them to the OEM 
terms.48 
Suppliers who do attempt to sneak in their boilerplate terms—either on 
the invoices or acknowledgments, or through what they sometimes call “let-
ters of interpretation” or “side-memos”—are generally doomed to fail. OEM 
attorneys instruct their purchasing managers to abort any incipient attempt 
to engage in the battle of the forms by affirmatively rejecting any of the sell-
ers’ forms or by getting the seller’s signature on the buyer’s form. The same 
is true for other sophisticated, high-tier buyers when dealing with the forms 
of their own downstream suppliers.49 
No Authority to Dicker. Another way in which OEMs prevent deviations 
from their own terms is by restricting the authority of agents within the or-
ganization to approve different or additional terms. Suppliers in the chain 
periodically try to negotiate or change the terms of the boilerplate imposed 
                                                                                                                      
 47. We suspect but could not confirm that the battle of the forms may occur as one goes 
deeper into the supply chain down to tier-3 and tier-4 suppliers. 
 48. For example, suppliers who objected to Ford’s new Global Terms and Conditions “were 
threatened with new business hold and award of pending business to competitors.” See Urgent 
Ford Global Terms and Conditions: Status Report Web Conference, OESA (Apr. 2, 2004). 
That survey shows that thirty-one out of forty-six Ford suppliers were warned that they would ex-
perience business reduction if they refused to accept Ford’s terms.  
 49. The finding that battles of the forms almost never occur is based on many conversations 
with attorneys in the industry. It may well be, though, that the picture portrayed by attorneys is not 
precise. Purchasing agents and engineering officers may have a particular interest in the deal—say 
because of the attractive price or the unique technology offered by the supplier—which would lead 
them to care little whether some “legal” terms are contested in a boilerplate letter sent by the sup-
plier. The attorneys’ score card, on the other hand, depends on their success in blocking ex post 
disputes and securing the most favorable boilerplate terms. It is perhaps this desire to boast and to 
display a successful legal record that distorts the picture we report. 
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by the OEMs or other buyers. Both OEM and supplier representatives agree 
that changes in the boilerplate resulting from negotiations with an individual 
seller are as rare as hens’ teeth. Ford, for example, has erected a clever and 
conscious barrier to such negotiation: only the global vice president for pur-
chasing has the authority to change the terms on the form contract. 
Similarly, in another OEM we observed a procedure in which only a senior 
purchasing committee of executives can approve a variation from the stan-
dard terms. By taking the authority away from the lower-level purchasing 
agents and their executives and granting it only to a person who presumably 
does not answer every phone call, these companies have raised a significant 
barrier to negotiation. Thus, no revision of a term can occur unless the per-
son proposing it can talk to someone in authority or can persuade a lower 
level person to do so. And what first-level purchasing manager wishes to 
besmirch his in-firm reputation as a tough negotiator and impair his chances 
for advancement by proposing to the big boss that the company make con-
cessions to a tier-1 supplier? In fact, this barrier is recognized by suppliers 
as credible and intimidating, discouraging them from demanding that some 
terms be negotiated. 
Furthermore, any variation in the legal terms would need to be drafted 
by a staff attorney. The legal offices of the OEMs simply do not have the 
resources to oversee frequent changes in the thousands of contracts entered 
into daily. This lack of legal capacity is another internal organizational hur-
dle, known to suppliers and deemed credible by them, that blocks any 
process of dickering over the legal terms. 
Equality of Treatment. Another factor that limits the incidence of varia-
tion from the boilerplate terms is the strong formal commitment of OEMs to 
treat all their suppliers equally. Of course, transactions with suppliers vary 
significantly with respect to the goods purchased, prices, volume, and the 
like. But all suppliers—from the mega corporations who produce car frames 
to the sellers of nuts and bolts—must take the same legal terms: payment 
provisions, termination rights, warranties and remedies, and so forth. OEMs 
believe that the fact that these terms are presented as nonnegotiable and that 
variations are not approved provides their suppliers with assurance that there 
is horizontal equity, that everyone is treated the same. In fact, this equity 
factor is a reason why one of the OEMs recently revised its entire set of boi-
lerplate provisions. It clarified to its suppliers that any concession negotiated 
by them in previous contracts would, of course, be honored for the duration 
of that contract (usually one year), but thereafter all terms would revert to 
the new set of “Global Terms and Conditions,” and the old concessions 
would expire unless affirmatively approved by the vice president.50 OEMs 
believe that suppliers recognize that more is at stake for the OEM than the 
individual concession. Their implicit position—“if we give one of you an 
accommodation, we’ll have to give it to others”—works strategically to 
                                                                                                                      
 50. Ford Motor Co. Production Purchasing Global Terms and Conditions § 4.09 (Jan. 2004) 
(on file with authors). 
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block any accommodations in the same way that most-favored-nation 
clauses bolster the commitment to avoid price discounts.51 
Open-Ended Provisions. The automotive industry is the typical example 
of a market in which contractual arrangements are long term. This is par-
ticularly true of OEM–tier-1 relationships, in which there are specific 
agreements to procure parts as long as the car model is produced, normally 
four to eight years. But relationships also extend beyond a single model to 
encompass many such car-model contracts and to cover the many years of 
supply of service parts. Given the difficulty of anticipating many factors that 
may become relevant in the course of performing the agreements, it is 
commonly noted that contracts signed up front must exhibit flexibility and 
must leave room for governance by ad hoc adjustments, agreements to 
agree, and informal norms. Indeed, the OEM boilerplate forms, although 
“tight” in many respects, contain many open-ended provisions that allow the 
parties to determine, in due time and if the contingency arises, matters of 
significant value. These open-ended clauses include price adjustments for 
changes in design; allocation of liability regarding the cost of recalls and 
other failures of components; indemnification of litigation costs in defend-
ing against injury claims by car owners and infringement of intellectual 
property claims; and more. These clauses leave it to the parties to “attempt 
in good faith to reach agreement” or to “negotiate diligently” the precise ex-
post term. In this way, up-front dickering is avoided, and suppliers are will-
ing to accept the contract although none of their needs are directly 
addressed. 
Interestingly, OEMs use such open-ended provisions to address some of 
the issues that would otherwise be most troubling for suppliers. When Ford 
recently redrafted its entire form, suppliers were invited to voice their con-
cerns and reactions to the proposed draft. While these meetings were not an 
open invitation to negotiate the new terms, they did represent the closest 
thing to negotiations over boilerplate, whereby uniform objections by sup-
pliers did lead to some—albeit minor—changes in the draft. Specifically, 
suppliers were disgruntled over terms that allowed OEMs to impose costly 
changes in design, terms that permit OEMs to setoff any cost incurred in 
servicing a recall or a warranty against the account of the supplier of the 
allegedly defective part, and terms that allocate a fixed share of the liability 
to the suppliers. Not surprisingly, it is with respect to these issues that the 
OEM elected to implement open-ended terms, postponing the dickering of 
the actual resolution of individual cases, if the issues arise, to the post-
performance stage. 
The Dissemination of Boilerplate Terms across Tiers. OEM contracts 
with their tier-1 suppliers affect the contracts entered into in lower tiers. 
Tier-1 suppliers, being strapped to the onerous OEM terms, turn around and 
offer the same terms to their own tier-2 suppliers. Of course, they may have 
less bargaining power to mandate their own terms, but at least the very large 
tier-1 companies—the twenty-five or so mega-corporations like Delphi and 
                                                                                                                      
 51. Avinash K. Dixit & Barry J. Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically 147–48 (1991). 
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Visteon that supply a large portfolio of parts—ordinarily have enough lever-
age to require suppliers to use their terms. Representatives of tier-1 suppliers 
admitted to us that they would have much preferred to use a more balanced 
contract both upstream and downstream, which again suggests that the 
OEMs terms are inefficient—the tier-1 companies are shielded from the 
terms’ distributive effect, and can be averse to them only because of the 
waste that they create. But given the OEM terms that are imposed on them 
in their capacity as sellers, they cannot afford to use other terms in their ca-
pacity as buyers. A striking metaphor that a tier-1 representative used is 
“contractual DNA.” Looking at contracts down the supply chain, one can 
identify the OEM for which a given supply is eventually intended by the 
terms of the lower-tier contracts. With each tier buyer copying some of the 
terms it had to accept as a supplier, the OEM’s terms are “genetically” repli-
cated down the chain. 
The special position of tier-1 suppliers explains their ambivalence to-
ward the otherwise concerted effort of suppliers in the automotive industry 
to advocate for “fairer” contracts. Some of this effort is coordinated by the 
suppliers’ trade association, the Original Equipment Suppliers Association 
(“OESA”). One of OESA’s projects was the drafting of the Model General 
Terms and Conditions, which is a self-proclaimed “more balanced approach 
to buyer-seller relations” with the goal of “increas[ing] cooperation, com-
munication, and trust between buyers and sellers.”52 Tier-1 representatives 
have generally been less than enthusiastic, however, in supporting this initia-
tive. Their concern is that if such an initiative would succeed and the use of 
the model terms would become a standard request of suppliers, it would 
harm their position vis-à-vis their lower-tier suppliers, without helping them 
much vis-à-vis the OEMs. If a tier-1 supplier has to sign a fixed-price con-
tract with an OEM for five years, it needs a contract with a tier-2 supplier 
that extends for the same period of time to enable it to maintain the fixed 
price.53  
III. Economic Power 
Although courts and lawyers sometimes talk about form contracts as 
nonnegotiable and subject to no limits, we know that is not true. Some 
drafters pull back from the limit of their economic power, some decline to 
exercise the rights that their contracts give, some contracts are invalidated 
                                                                                                                      
 52. Original Equip. Suppliers Ass’n, OESA Publications: Model Terms and Condi-
tions 3 (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.oesa.org/publications/index.php (last visited Jan. 10, 
2006). 
 53. In Germany, an organization called the Verband der Automobilindustrie negotiates with 
the OEMs on behalf of the suppliers. See supra note 30. The OEM forms used in Germany are the 
product of this collective bargaining. If initiatives in the United States like OESA’s are to succeed 
the way they succeed in Germany, they have to start with the OEMs; the terms will then trickle 
down the supply tiers. Because the OEMs do not appear willing to enter into such a bargain and 
because the tier-1 suppliers cannot afford to enter into a bargain without the OEMs entering into one 
first, we do not foresee a collective agreement in the United States among the suppliers and the 
OEMs of the kind that apparently exists in Germany. 
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by courts, and others are constrained by legislation, regulation, or by threat 
of litigation or legislation. In this part, we examine how market power 
shapes the deals and the contracts, with an eye to the specific provisions in 
the OEMs’ purchase orders that are aimed at securing their economic power. 
At the outset of this study, we hypothesized that OEMs’ bargaining 
power would be strongest at the bidding and contract formation stage and 
weakest once relationship-specific investments were made and performance 
began. We imagined that once the OEMs became dependent on a supplier, 
they would face instances of hold up, in which the supplier demanded better 
price and other terms. The standard hold-up account seems to fit this situa-
tion perfectly—in fact, the hold-up theory was developed in the context of 
the GM–Fisher Body saga, which was an OEM–tier-1 relation. This hy-
pothesis turned out to be surprisingly misguided, as we will explain below. 
We also hypothesized that economic power would echo down the supply 
tiers, with tier-1 suppliers being dominated by OEMs but exercising their 
own dominance over tier-2 suppliers. This too turned out to be only partially 
true. Some powerful companies, such as Exxon and General Electric, are in 
the tier-2 levels and are able to wield power because of their size and prod-
uct mix. Other tier-2 suppliers have power because of their wide base of 
clients, extending beyond the automotive industry, and can afford to pass on 
automotive contracts. Yet other low-tier suppliers have power that is sup-
ported by the uniqueness of their technology. Finally, the financial integrity 
of a firm turned out to affect its economic power in ways that are more sub-
tle than we expected. 
As we mentioned above, the OEM representatives freely admitted that 
their forms included most terms that the drafters thought necessary or help-
ful to protect their clients’ interests, and that they did not feel obliged to add 
similar terms that their sellers might have liked. For example, all of the 
OEM contracts (and presumably most between suppliers) give the buyer the 
right to terminate the contract without cause in certain circumstances and to 
cancel it for cause in other cases. The sellers get no corresponding rights of 
termination or cancellation. This power, along with the absence of a quantity 
commitment on the part of the OEM, makes the contract so one-sided that it 
runs the risk of being unenforceable.54 European suppliers have complained 
that such one-sided terms would be unenforceable under various European 
doctrines of contractual fairness, competition law (for instance, the term 
prohibiting suppliers from selling parts in the aftermarket), and corporate 
governance (the supplier’s corporate executive may not have the internal 
authority to sign such a poor contract without shareholder authorization).55 
How far can OEMs go in drafting one-sided terms? Surely, if suppliers 
have choices, they can bargain away these clauses. But for automotive sup-
pliers who sell a large chunk of their output to OEMs, in a market in which 
                                                                                                                      
 54. We are aware of only one case in which a supplier rejected the contract and argued lack 
of mutuality. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Steel Dynamics, No. CR-04-056983-CK (Cir. Ct. Oakland 
County, Mich. 2004). 
 55.  Bradford Wernle, Ford Vendors Balk at Tough Contract, Auto. News, July 5, 2004, at 8. 
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suppliers suffer severe overcapacity, there does not appear to be much 
choice. A CEO of one of Ford’s suppliers was quoted in the Automotive 
News to say that Ford’s terms are effective in “closing every possible loop-
hole. We’re responsible for acts of God now.”56 At the same time, the 
collective disgruntlement that echoed in the suppliers’ corps did not change 
any of the terms. Another supplier admitted that “[i]f you don’t have a point 
of leverage, you don’t have much ability to fight back.”57 Other attempts, 
made under the umbrella of the suppliers’ trade association, OESA, to col-
lectively draft a form more favorable to sellers58 have not, as far as we can 
tell, influenced even a single term of the OEMs’ contract forms. 
A. Lower-Tier Contracts 
When we move down from OEM contracts to lower tiers in the supply 
chain, bargaining power is no longer one-sided. Tier-1 suppliers cannot exert 
the same influence on tier-2s as OEMs exerted against them. For one, tier-1 
suppliers do not offer the same magnitude and rarity of deals as OEMs do. If 
an OEM turns down a bid by a manufacturer of passenger seats, a big chunk 
of the business cannot be salvaged. On the other hand, if the same manufac-
turer of seats breaks the negotiations with the supplier of leather, that 
supplier would have many other business opportunities. Moreover, under 
contracts with OEMs, tier-1 suppliers occasionally are bound to use specific 
tier-2 suppliers. Similarly, once awarded a big contract by the OEMs, tier-1s 
have less flexibility to turn down suppliers. Time is of the essence and the 
tier-1 supplier must secure its own sources of supply, exposing it to potential 
hold up by a tier-2 supplier who is particularly well positioned to supply the 
goods in time. 
Still, we find that tier-1 suppliers have some success overcoming these 
weaknesses and imposing their own terms on their suppliers. Some tier-1 
self-drafted contracts include terms that their own attorneys admit are more 
onerous than the OEM terms. For example, the tier-1 contract we saw pro-
vided that the tier-2 supplier must indemnify the buyer for one hundred 
percent of the liability that the buyer bears vis-à-vis the OEM. That is, while 
OEM contracts either leave the issue of the division of liability for costly 
recalls and other defects open or impose a fifty-percent-unless-otherwise-
agreed-upon split, the tier-1 contract imposed one hundred percent of the 
liability on the supplier.59 The reason, it was explained to us, is that OEMs 
have the ex-post power, once a recall occurs, to dictate the supplier’s share, 
and there is not much a disgruntled supplier can do other than plead for a 
fair allocation. On the other hand, tier-2 suppliers can fight back and in 
some events litigate or seek arbitration to settle these issues. Thus, to 
                                                                                                                      
 56. Amy Wilson & Bradford Wernle, Ford Gives Suppliers Tough Terms, Auto. News, Feb. 
16, 2004, at 1 (quoting the CEO of a Ford supplier). 
 57. Id. (quoting a supplier executive). 
 58. OESA Analysis, supra note 11. 
 59. See Delphi Corp. General Terms and Conditions, supra note 25. 
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counter the greater ex-post power of tier-2s, that contract was written with a 
more onerous term. 
Moreover, when terms are disputed by their suppliers at the negotiation 
stage, tier-1 companies resort to what can be labeled a “golden rule.” Since 
pro-buyer boilerplate terms were imposed on the tier-1 by the OEMs when 
the tier-1s played the role of a seller, it is only fair that the tier-1 company 
would use symmetric terms in their roles as buyers. The argument made by 
tier-1s, that they cannot afford to give their sellers better terms because they 
cannot turn around and negotiate similar concessions as sellers to the 
OEMs, is often successful. It is this mechanism that causes the OEM terms 
to be replicated downstream. 
B. Sellers’ Power Due to Switching Costs  
An important factor that appeared to influence the contracts among the 
OEMs and suppliers was the OEMs’ significant switching costs. All of the 
OEM representatives, while recognizing that they have much of the bargain-
ing power at the bidding stage, acknowledged that the pendulum shifts and 
suppliers may have some power in the course of carrying out a long-term 
contract. Many current contracts are for intricate subassemblies that will be 
installed wholesale into a finished automobile. For example, an OEM might 
buy the entire heating and cooling system from a supplier, and the supplier 
might be the principal designer of the system. Since any such system must 
integrate with the car’s electrical and other systems and must conform to the 
physical location that is set aside for it in the completed automobile, the 
“part” may be unique. It is this uniqueness that accords the supplier the 
power. 
Put differently, there are high switching costs in auto manufacturing. 
Switching costs are high because of the significant technological invest-
ments that other suppliers would have to expend to be able to fill the 
required order. For example, a tier-1 supplier may make all of the frames of 
a high-volume vehicle. That supplier built an assembly line to manufacture 
the frames and had considerable difficulty meeting the OEM’s technological 
requirements. These same complexities of building and operating an entire 
assembly line would confront any new supplier if the OEM fired its current 
supplier. Such difficulties cannot be overcome in a short period of time.60 
Switching costs are also high because of safety problems. If the sup-
plier’s work relates to the brakes, engine operation, passenger restraints or 
the car’s suspension, defects may pose safety risks and may be an integral 
part of the OEM’s satisfaction of governmental safety regulations. If the 
replacement of one supplier’s part with another’s would require additional 
safety tests to comply with governmental regulations, one can be sure that 
any change of suppliers would be costly and time consuming. Moreover, 
                                                                                                                      
 60. But see Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Rethinking Relationship-Specific Invest-
ments: Subcontracting in the Japanese Automobile Industry, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2636 (2000) 
(providing an account of the Japanese auto industry and suggesting that relationship-specific in-
vestments and switching costs play less of a role than is usually assumed). 
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even without having to comply with safety regulations, switching costs may 
be high because of the need to integrate the component with other parts and 
to test its performance before assembling it into the vehicle. It is for these 
reasons that an OEM usually relies upon the “sole-source” supply method, 
under which it purchases its requirements of parts or raw materials from one 
supplier. Using more than one supplier—either by switching over time or 
contemporaneously—would significantly increase the testing and tooling 
costs, lead to inconsistent quality, and undermine economies of scale. 
If an OEM who abandons a supplier would suffer prohibitive costs in 
finding and qualifying a replacement, it may be conjectured that the original 
supplier has some economic power over the OEM for the contracted goods 
or services for some period—perhaps even to the end of the model run of 
the vehicle in which the part or assembly is installed. This power, we should 
expect, would be at its height shortly after production commences when the 
supplier looks forward to five years of work and the competing bidders have 
turned to other things. In fact, this conjecture—that a tier-1 supplier can 
exert hold-up power against an OEM after production begins—is widely 
recognized as the benchmark example in economic theory for the general 
problem of contractual hold up. The standard account of the hold-up prob-
lem was developed and generically illustrated in the context of the very 
same OEM–tier-1 contracts that we explored. It suggests that in the 1920s, 
Fisher Body (a tier-1 supplier of automotive bodies) had a ten-year require-
ments contract with General Motors. When GM’s requirements increased 
due to the greater demand for closed-body cars, Fisher Body enjoyed an 
“intolerable” position to hold up General Motors and to refuse to make ad-
justments that were overall efficient, and was therefore acquired and 
vertically integrated into GM.61 It is not clear how much evidence substanti-
ates the GM–Fisher Body hold-up story,62 and yet it seems plausible that in 
light of the high switching costs, OEMs would indeed be vulnerable to rent-
extraction. As one leading economist explains: 
Why did GM and Fisher Body not simply write a better contract? Argua-
bly, GM recognized that, however good a contract it wrote with Fisher 
Body, [. . .] contingencies might occur that no contract could allow for. 
GM wanted to be sure that next time around it would be in a stronger bar-
                                                                                                                      
 61. See Klein et al., supra note 1; Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational 
Ownership: The Fisher Body–General Motors Relationship Revisited, 4 J.L. Econ. & Org. 199 
(1988). The Klein account of the Fisher Body–GM merger and its illustrative role for the theory of 
the firm has been widely embraced. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff, 
Modern Industrial Organization 13 (2d ed. 1994).  
 62. In recent studies, Ronald Coase and others have argued that GM’s takeover of Fisher 
Body did not intend to solve contractual hold up by Fisher Body—in fact, no such hold up ever 
occurred—but rather to secure GM’s stronghold over a critical supplier vis-à-vis other OEMs. See 
R.H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, 43 J.L. & Econ. 15 (2000); Doug-
las G. Baird, In Coase’s Footsteps, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 23 (2003); Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & 
Daniel F. Spulber, The Fable of Fisher Body, 43 J.L. & Econ. 67 (2000); Robert Freeland, Creating 
Holdup Through Vertical Integration: Fisher Body Revisited, 43 J.L. & Econ. 33 (2000). 
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gaining position; in particular, it would be able to insist on extra supplies, 
without having to pay a great deal for them.63 
Our own findings suggest that, at least in the automotive business, this 
bargaining position–hold-up account is misguided. For one, the contracts are 
pretty good at dealing with this problem, as we will show below. But even 
without looking into the contractual language, this account ignores the fact 
that each individual transaction is only part of a larger portfolio of business, 
both concurrently and into the future. Even for unique goods, the power of 
the supplier to hold up its buyer is effectively limited. If the seller uses its 
power to engage in explicit hold up (for instance, “Give me an increase in 
price or I won’t ship”) it knows it will lose in the long run. One OEM repre-
sentative emphasized that the buyers “have long memories” and assured us 
that a successful threat by a seller would surely count against it in the award 
of new contracts. Even more threatening, the representative told us, is that a 
major disruption at one OEM is likely to become known to the others and to 
be considered by other OEMs when bids are being evaluated. Representa-
tives of suppliers concurred with this skeptical view. If a supplier puts a gun 
to the head of the OEM, it would be “suicide,” they claim; the short-term 
benefit from extracting some concession will be more than offset by the 
long-term reputation sanction. 
The myth that suppliers can engage in hold up overlooks a very basic 
fact. Suppliers trying to hold up OEMs must threaten to halt production of a 
part that is necessary to keep the assembly line working. Such a threat, if 
carried out, would lead to enormous losses, constituting an entire meltdown 
in the industry. The tier-1 supplier who commits such a hold up would there-
fore be subjected to potentially bankrupting damages, some of which can be 
setoff by the OEM against the supplier’s account as a matter of self-help. 
Moreover, the OEM would likely be able to get injunctive relief,64 thus bar-
ring such a threat from being carried out in the first place. In other words, 
the hold-up account assumes lethargic contractual obligation and legal en-
forcement, which is probably far from reality. 
Moreover, in his rebuttal of the Fisher Body myth, Ronald Coase specu-
lated that problems of supplier hold up can be addressed by OEMs 
contractually.65 We have seen some evidence for such contractual arrange-
ments. First, OEMs have almost unconstrained authority to terminate 
contracts. That is, if anyone has the contractual power to threaten to walk 
away, it is the OEM, not the supplier. True, they may not want to terminate a 
contract for supply of unique parts, but they can threaten to terminate other 
contracts with this same supplier, to phase out its business. Second, OEMs 
maintain significant property rights in “tooling,” namely in the machines 
and production assets at the suppliers’ plants, and they can haul these assets 
away once the contract is terminated, often with only stingy compensation 
                                                                                                                      
 63. Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure 7 (1995). 
 64. Johnson Controls v. A.P.T. Critical Sys., 323 F. Supp. 2d 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 65. See Coase supra note 62. 
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for suppliers’ sunk investment.66 Thus, a supplier is in effect posting a bond 
against hold up; its investment will be amortized in the course of produc-
tion, but only if it sticks around for the long haul.67 Third, OEMs reserve for 
themselves, in other boilerplate terms, the right to control the very profitable 
market for service parts for years, sometimes decades, into the future, and to 
potentially share this profit with suppliers. Suppliers that hold up the OEM 
in the short run will lose in a big way in the division of the aftermarket sur-
plus. Finally, buyers in this industry do enjoy some success in securing court 
injunctions against breach68 and can thus fend off suppliers who are holding 
up in order to renegotiate existing terms. 
In his rebuttal of the GM–Fisher Body myth, Coase then is correct in as-
serting that contractual provisions can protect OEMs from hold up.69 But a 
more important aspect, we believe, and one that is also recognized by 
Coase, is that the “concern for their reputation would also have deterred the 
Fisher brothers from engaging in [hold up].”70 The explanations we heard 
from all the participants confirmed that it is indeed the OEMs’ long memo-
ries and the sanctions they can levy upon bad suppliers in future deals—that 
is, reputation sanctions—that render hold up a bad strategy for tier-1 suppli-
ers. Any short-term gain to be had by this offensive bargaining tactic will be 
greatly offset by long-term losses in future deals. The hold-up myth fails 
because it is based on a false empirical assumption that suppliers specialize 
in a single part or assembly. In reality, many of the suppliers—and the large 
ones in particular—supply hundreds of parts and assemblies to the OEMs. 
Their business is not to supply a part, but a portfolio of parts. Even if they 
have some power with respect to one part, it does not change the fact that as 
suppliers of portfolios whose only clients are the few OEMs, they are cap-
tives, rather than hijackers. That is, the business plan of these supply 
firms—large diversified companies that specialize in automotive parts—is to 
build a symbiotic relationship with their clients, a fabric of reliability that 
will be completely undermined by hold up. 
Thus, if long-term contracts confer power on the weaker seller but the 
seller cannot engage in hold up, how is that power used? First the power 
ameliorates the standard contract termination or cancellation terms. If the 
                                                                                                                      
 66. See Miwa and Ramseyer, supra note 60, at 2642; Baird, supra note 62, at 26 (noting that 
the GM–Fisher hold-up account is not plausible because GM could have retained ownership of dies, 
which it would be able to retrieve in case Fisher engaged in hold up). 
 67. This ownership-of-tooling mechanism may appear to conform in part to the Klein-
Crawford-Alchian hypothesis, that the problem of hold up is addressed through vertical integration. 
See supra note 1. What we found in the contracts is indeed an ownership solution, but not one that 
rises to complete integration. Instead, OEMs have devised a subtle scheme in which they maintain 
partial ownership rights in the supplier’s tooling, rights that gradually diminish over the life of the 
contract as the hold-up scare diminishes. The rights do not give them actual control of the organiza-
tion of production but may allow them to exclude commingling and other uses, thereby reducing the 
alternative value of the assets to the supplier. 
 68. See, e.g., Delphi Auto. Sys. v. Eaton Corp., No. 05-55257-CK (Mich. Cir. Ct. Saginaw 
County Jan. 31, 2005) (order granting preliminary injunction). 
 69. Coase, supra note 62, at 30. 
 70. Id. 
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buyer cannot find a replacement, it cannot exercise its legal right to cancel. 
Second, particularly with a weak supplier, the contract may mitigate an 
OEM’s setoff or hold-back of funds earned when the OEM claims that the 
supplier broke the contract. If the supplier is in a weak financial state, the 
OEM risks losing the supplier’s production if it reduces the supplier’s cash 
flow by setoff. We suspect that the seller’s power is also expressed in more 
subtle effects on the buyer’s use of its boilerplate. For example. we can 
imagine buyers hesitating to be as aggressive as they might be in using the 
boilerplate indemnity provision against an important seller. As we suggest 
above, a seller needs to be felicitous in its use of this power (for instance, 
“Can you give me some help with my increased material costs?”) to escape 
identification as a chiseler who should be avoided when new contracts are 
awarded. Further, since many tier-1 suppliers produce a portfolio of parts, 
they can leverage the power they have in the supply of one crucial compo-
nent to secure additional deals for other parts. 
C. Bankruptcy 
The picture of a weak tier-1 supplier, squeezed by powerful OEMs that 
demand ever growing discounts, can change dramatically when the supplier 
experiences insolvency. When this happens, suppliers’ threats to stop per-
forming critical contracts become credible. They are credible because they 
come not from a company that is concerned with long-term business, but 
from stern bankruptcy workout specialists who have no attachment to next 
year’s business or even to next month’s if current crises can be sur-
mounted.71 In the automotive industry of today, in which suppliers’ 
bankruptcy has become a real danger72 and their threat to file in Chapter 11 
more credible, many suppliers who are known to be suffering losses have a 
more powerful negotiation position vis-à-vis their buyers.73 
Ironically, at times when the supplier’s costs increase unexpectedly, it is 
that very weakness of the supplier’s economic power and its inability to se-
cure modifications to the contracts with the OEMs that can send it to 
bankruptcy and eventually bolster the credibility of its threat. Threats from the 
weak and desperate are more powerful than threats from the strong and ra-
tional. Indeed, the increasing hardship of the American automotive industry 
                                                                                                                      
 71. For a general discussion of why a threat to breach becomes credible in bankruptcy, see 
Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 717 (2005). See also Jeffrey 
McCracken, Plan OK’d for Aid to Keep C & A Supplying, Detroit Free Press, July 8, 2005, avail-
able at 2005 WLNR 10705184. 
 72. During the time we conducted this study, five major automobile suppliers filed in Chap-
ter 11: Delphi (the world’s largest tier-1 supplier), Tower Automotive (a builder of frames for the 
Ford Explorer), Intermet (a steel supplier), Meridian (a steering parts producer), and Collins and 
Aikman (a maker of plastic trim, interior fabric and plastic parts such as dash board consoles and 
head liners). See Robert Sherefkin, Suppliers’ Woes Put Bond Ratings on the Junk Heap, Auto. 
News, Aug. 8, 2005, at 1. 
 73. For example, prior to filing for bankruptcy, tier-1 supplier Delphi issued a threat to Gen-
eral Motors and to the UAW, demanding renegotiation of many prior agreements. See Brett Clanton, 
Delphi’s Troubles May Cost GM, Detroit News, Aug. 31, 2005, at 1. 
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provides ample examples of this unfortunate dynamic.74 These examples 
confirm that tier-1 suppliers have no power to hold up the OEMs when the 
OEMs know that their suppliers regard the costs of long-term retribution as 
greater than the near term gains from improved terms. But when retribution 
loses its effect, hold up can be significant. Still, suppliers generally believe 
that even if it is bankruptcy that drives the price renegotiation, the victorious 
supplier will suffer significant detriments in future dealings. 
IV. The Exceptions: Deviations from the Boilerplate 
A. Information Technology Transactions 
In this sea of refusal to budge, which we describe above, we did find one 
area in which the OEMs often negotiate boilerplate terms and agree to devi-
ate from the global terms. All of the OEMs reported that their relationships 
with information technology providers were different from their relation-
ships with conventional suppliers. IT suppliers sometimes successfully force 
the OEMs to sign on to their own forms; other times they successfully nego-
tiate revisions of the standard global terms in areas of great importance. In 
fact, some OEMs have drafted different forms for IT suppliers. Ordinarily, 
IT suppliers insist on terms that grant them greater ownership in the intellec-
tual property. They also successfully limit their liability and cap it at a level 
far below the liability that conventional suppliers may face, usually not to 
exceed the price paid for the component. Finally, they are reluctant to pro-
vide the same types of extensive warranties that OEMs usually demand. 
Why do IT suppliers succeed in extracting more favorable boilerplate? 
We heard explanations focusing on the concentration and leverage of the IT 
suppliers, led by Microsoft and other superpowers. This is probably true in 
the automotive context, where the IT firms are more diverse suppliers, less 
dependent on their OEM buyers. But this explanation does not account for 
the fact that even less powerful IT suppliers enjoy the more favorable terms. 
Another conjecture is that for IT companies, the intellectual property 
clauses in the contracts are critical, as this is their only asset. Standing to 
lose more from the OEMs’ IP provisions, their resistance to these expropria-
tory clauses is therefore more credible. 
And yet IT firms succeed not only in securing better intellectual prop-
erty terms but also far more lenient warranty and remedies provisions. We 
                                                                                                                      
 74. One prominent example is Collins and Aikman (“C&A”), a tier-1 supplier who entered 
bankruptcy in May 2005. This company, which makes parts used in 90% of American cars, many of 
which are irreplaceable complex assemblies manufactured in factories that are symbiotically at-
tached to OEMs’ plants, was unable to leverage the uniqueness of its products into profitable 
contracts. The more it grew, the more dependent it became on future contracts from the OEMs and the 
weaker was its economic power in the bargaining game. When C&A filed for bankruptcy under Chap-
ter 11, it threatened to stop performance unless its contracts were renegotiated and the prices 
increased—that is, it engaged in classic hold up. Given its well-known cash shortage and the demands 
of unsecured creditors to stop performance of losing contracts, C&A had a credible threat. The 
payoff from the use of this power was quick: the three OEMs agreed to give C&A $82.5 million by 
raising the prices on their existing supply contracts with C&A by 15%, to purchase $140 million of 
tooling, and to make a loan of $82.5 million. See McCracken, supra note 71. 
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found this feature to be the most puzzling. Could it be explained by the fact 
that, unlike the ordinary tier-1 assemblers, IT firms do not buy parts and 
therefore do not have many tier-2s to which they can turn around and dump 
similar anti-seller terms?  
The prevalence of warranty and remedy limitations in the IT area can per-
haps be explained by the nature of information products. It is often difficult to 
determine whether a defect in the operation of the integrated component is a 
result of bugs in the software or inadequate specification requested by the 
client. When a machine shuts down due to software problems, the conse-
quential harm may be huge, and yet the fix may be simple and cheap. 
Moreover, IT firms provide their services to a variety of industries and 
products. Similar technologies and information can be adapted to heteroge-
neous products and applications. Thus, it is beyond the expertise of the IT 
supplier to foresee the types and magnitude of the consequential harm that a 
defect might cause, and it is therefore hard to insure. Self-insurance by the 
more specialized buyer makes economic sense. As a result, suppliers of IT 
are unwilling to provide warranties beyond repair and replacement. 
B. Japanese Manufacturers.  
Outside the area of IT contracts, we discovered that at least some of the 
Asian OEMs will modify some parts of their boilerplate terms. One tier-1 
supplier reported that a Japanese OEM would listen to focused and well-
reasoned objections to particular provisions of its form contract. The tier-1 
supplier emphasized that even the Japanese OEM would not agree to whole-
sale changes to its form, but he made clear that the Japanese attitude toward 
negotiation was markedly different from that of American OEMs. Another 
source confirmed that while Toyota and Honda have contracts with strict 
terms, they view their relationship with suppliers as long term and place 
more value on suppliers’ satisfaction. 
So why are the Japanese OEMs more generous than the American OEMs 
to their suppliers? Doubtless part of the reason is cultural,75 having to do with 
norms of negotiation and the like.76 Also, it is sometimes speculated that Japa-
nese manufacturers may be sensitive to the hostile publicity that they might 
earn if they contribute to the demise of a large American manufacturer of 
                                                                                                                      
 75. See generally John L. Graham, The Japanese Negotiation Style: Characteristics of a 
Distinct Approach, 9 Negotiation J. 123 (1993). 
 76. The following anecdote illustrates the type of behavior that we denote “cultural.” One of 
our respondents in an American tier-2 company explained how a tier-1 Japanese supplier agreed to 
give a price increase. The American supplier had agreed to make and sell a part to the tier-1 supplier 
for approximately $3.00. When the first parts were delivered they were missing one weld. The weld 
had been identified on the drawings in Japanese, and the seller had failed to translate that part of the 
instructions. When the parties discovered this, the Japanese buyer agreed to add 7¢ to the price to 
cover the cost of the additional weld—with the admonition that the seller had better get it right the 
next time. The seller’s representative assured us that any American OEM would have “pointed to the 
contract” and forced the seller to eat the cost. 
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supply parts.77 But we believe that an important reason is the economic dis-
tress of the American OEMs. Several representatives traced the current state 
of “war” between OEMs and suppliers to a managerial change that occurred 
in General Motors in the 1980s. Earlier, American OEMs in general, and 
GM in particular, were more generous with suppliers in all phases of their 
relations. But the mounting losses of the auto manufacturers could find an 
outlet in only a few places. Even though improvident contracts for pay, pen-
sions, and health benefits with the UAW may be the principal cause of the 
current economic distress, no OEM has the power to open a labor contract 
and get large concessions from the union. That meant OEMs turned to easier 
prey: their suppliers. 
Most of the Japanese manufacturers (Nissan and Mitsubishi may be ex-
ceptions) have not suffered the same distress. Both Toyota and Honda have 
been consistently profitable78 for many reasons, for instance good manage-
ment, the absence of union contracts with their American workers, the 
comparative youth of their American workers, and the Japanese state’s as-
sumption of some of the liabilities in Japan that private companies must bear 
in the United States. Both the earlier American experience and reason sug-
gest that insistence on one’s own tough terms with no exceptions is the kind 
of thing that no business person does without a strong economic incentive, 
like business distress. 
C. “Backdoor” Negotiations.  
Staff attorneys within the OEMs are of course the organ that keeps the 
tightest control on the boilerplate terms and guards against deviations. Other 
organs—specifically, engineers and purchasing agents—may have slightly 
divergent goals and motivations. The purchasing representatives are inter-
ested in the cost of the item and their performance is measured by their 
success in getting the lowest price. Engineers are interested in quality and 
uniqueness of features and operation and are less interested in cost. The en-
gineering success is measured by how well the car works, the extent of 
warranty obligation it causes and, of course, how well it sells. A time-
honored but relatively crude way for a supplier to get better legal terms is to 
convince the OEM engineers that the supplier’s part is the only acceptable 
part and to get the engineer to write the specifications to exclude others. Or 
one might get the engineers to agree to “engineering change orders” that 
modify the specification of the part, enable the supplier to quote a new price 
(without going through a competitive bidding process), and increase the 
profit on the sale of the part. These ploys that result in higher prices offset 
some of cost of unfavorable boilerplate. 
                                                                                                                      
 77. Norihiko Shirouzu, Toyota Lobbies to Avoid Blame Amid U.S. Auto Industry Woes, Wall 
St. J., Aug. 12, 2005, at A2. 
 78. Jay Palmer, Taking on the World: Toyota’s Revving Up for a Bigger Chunk of the 
Global Auto Market, Barron’s Online, May 5, 2003, available at http://www.logos4me.com/ 
Investment%20News/Taking%20on%20the%20World.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2005); Yuval 
Rosenberg et al., The Top Picks from 50 Great Investors, Fortune, Dec. 29, 2003, at 70. 
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More subtle indirect changes in the contract may also come in through 
the engineers or by the addition of a term that the purchasing manager does 
not regard as part of his “cost.” For example a supplier may negotiate for a 
side agreement that permits the supplier to use the OEM’s tooling to make 
aftermarket parts, a right that the boilerplate would deny. Since the sup-
plier’s profit on the aftermarket parts may be substantial yet the purchasing 
manager might not regard that as part of his “price,” the seller gets some-
thing of considerable value. One tier-1 representative spoke of the pricing 
for service parts and change in the terms of the warranty process as exam-
ples of terms in the boilerplate that the OEMs might alter by a side 
agreement if a successful pitch has been made to an organ within the OEM 
who cares more about other factors. In these cases too, the base price stated 
in the contract would not change but the change would have measurable and 
predictable value for the supplier. 
Conclusion 
So there you have it—sophisticated companies use rigid boilerplate 
forms to govern tens of billions of dollars of sales every year. The drafters of 
these forms are not the least embarrassed in admitting that they draft every 
term in a one-sided, self-serving manner. It turns out that such unrestrained 
economic power in contracting is exercised not merely against the weak and 
ill advised, but also against sophisticated partners to relational contracts. 
And yet, in numerous discussions with suppliers and their representatives, 
we have not heard the word “unconscionability” even once. Obviously, there 
is no element of duress or unfair surprise in the formation of these contracts. 
It is the understanding of all who are involved in this market that bargaining 
power is the name of the game, and that the only way to reform the contracts 
is to alter some fundamental features of this market to affect the division of 
economic power. 
Our study has obvious limitations. Since our primary interest was the 
boilerplate contracts, the evidence we collected came from “legal” 
sources—the contracts, the lawyers who draft them, the lawyers represent-
ing the parties to the purchase agreements, and the very small body of case 
law. In the shadow of this legal cloud there may be a different business real-
ity in which transactions occur in a more balanced way, and OEMs exercise 
their power and their contractual entitlements in a selective and less selfish 
manner. While we cannot rule out such a possibility, it does not seem plau-
sible. Representatives of suppliers with whom we spoke exhibited too much 
frustration with the OEMs’ legal terms; they appear to believe that the real-
ity of the business is consistent with the picture portrayed by the boilerplate. 
What are the lessons that can be drawn from this study? Unlike some 
prior studies of automotive contracts, we do not claim any general conclu-
sions about contractual behavior, nor do we aim any critique at the law or 
advocate any legal reform. The automotive production business is suffi-
ciently idiosyncratic that much of what we have learned may be applicable 
only to this industry. For one, it is clear that much of the bargaining power 
BEN-SHAHAR & WHITE FINAL TYPE.DOC 2/16/2006 11:09 AM 
982 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:953 
 
account stems from the specific structure of the industry, in which special-
ized tier-1 companies are “captives”—they have immense investments in 
production capacity and can sell only to a handful of clients. But this study 
does show patterns that may have broader application. It identifies the im-
portant role that internal organization structures play in the formation of 
form contracts. A story we all heard many times is that organizational con-
cerns can explain the necessity of standard forms. That is, forms are a way 
for principals to exert control over terms offered by their agents. But what 
we found here was the flip side of this account. The internal hierarchy is not 
the reason for the forms but rather an instrument in implementing the forms 
as-is, without allowing any erosion of the terms. Constantly under pressure 
by counterparties to vary some terms, buyers have erected artificial internal 
structures to prevent purchasing agents from yielding to such pressures. This 
internal rigidity also explains the absence of “menus”—the refusal of the 
drafting party to set prices under which its counterparties can “buy” better 
terms. 
While some of our findings can be explained with clear economic logic, 
for others we did not find a compelling explanation. We do not offer a satis-
factory explanation for the variance of terms across the different OEM 
contracts, or for the conjecture that some of these terms are inefficient. If we 
are right in suggesting that there is inefficiency in the legal provisions, it is 
possible—given the enormous stakes in this industry—that a lot of money is 
left on the table. Clearly, the OEMs are using any means to reduce costs and 
are pressuring their suppliers to the maximum extent. But by using such 
harsh terms, the OEMs may be creating (or at least, not eliminating) the 
deadweight loss. Another finding that left us puzzled is the IT forms; these 
are a remarkable exception to the otherwise one-sided boilerplate in the in-
dustry. We can offer only guesses as to why IT firms succeed in securing 
better terms. We leave this question for future inquiry. 
Finally, this study reinforces some doubts about theories of asymmetric 
information in contracting. We mentioned that a prominent line of thought 
in economic theory identifies contractual failures as the reason for why 
firms organize the way they do and why some activities are outsourced and 
others are done in-house. Since auto production contracts have served an 
important role in demonstrating these insights (the GM–Fisher Body story), 
we took a closer look at the actual contracts. We discovered a reality in 
which more things are “contractible” than previously suggested; where 
asymmetric information and imperfect verification are rarely obstacles for 
contracting; and where reputation sanctions quickly fill any void that the 
contracts may have left. And yet, the familiar economic story of vertical 
integration is not necessarily undermined. While it is not manifested through 
outright takeover of supplier firms, we discovered that integration in produc-
tion occurs in more subtle ways, such as contingent control over production 
assets and technological innovations. 
